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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
000O000 
RONALD CURTIS, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH. BOARD OF PARDONS, 
et al., 
Respondents/Appellees, 
000O000 
Case No. 930360 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
78-2a-3 (g), Utah Code Annotated. 
2. Constitutional provisions pertinent to this appeal are 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I section 7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
3. The issues presented on this appeal are; 
a. Were sufficient facts and allegations pleaded in the 
petition to warrant review by the lower court. 
b. Does an inmate have due process rights in parole board 
hearings, and 
c. Did the trial court abuse itfs discretion in dismissing 
the petition without a hearing on the merits. 
1. 
FACTS 
The petitioner, Ronald Curtis was found guilty of sexual abuse and 
sentenced to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State 
Prison. He appeared before the Utah Board of Pardons on 3 March 
1989* During his initial parole grant hearing the Utah Board of 
Pardons sentenced the petitioner to serve all of the one to fifteen 
year term. The Board refused to provide documents with they made 
this determination, they refused to allow the petitioner to 
speak on his own behalf or to allow anyone to speak for him* The 
Board refused to allow the petitioner to present any mitigating 
evidence in his own behalf, or to call any witnesses. 
On 5 April 1993, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 
relief in the Third Judicial District Court. The petition made 
factual allegations of the denial of due process, by the Utah 
Board of Pardons, during the petitioners parole grant hearing. 
These allegations, if proven, were sufficient to warrant both 
habeas corpus review, and habeas corpus relief. 
On 4 May 1993, Judge David S. Young dismissed the petition on itfs 
face without hearing. See attached order dismissing petition. 
This appeal follows that dismissal. 
ARGUMENT 
Judge David S. Young abused his discretion by dismissing the 
petitioners complaint without hearing. Judge Young stated in pairt 
that requiring the petitioner to serve all fifteen years was 
within the Boards discretion. 
2. 
However, Judge Young failed to address the many allegations 
wherein the petitioner alleged that he was denied the right to 
speak, defend, present evidence or witnesses* Judge Young failed 
to take notice of the many facts that gave rise to the petition 
or the cause of action therein* 
Does an inmate have a right to speak on his own behalf at 
a parole grant hearing? The Board's own policy dictates that he 
does indeed have that right. See attached Board policy, R671-301. 
Does an inmate have a right to see documents used against 
him at a parole grant hearing ? Again, the Board1s policy requires 
that access. See attached policy, R671-303. 
By refusing to allow the petitioner to see documents used 
against him, and refusing to allow him to speak on his own behalf, 
the Board violated the petitioners right to due process. 
Our Supreme Court visited the issue of due process ±% Utah 
Board of Pardons hearings in the Foote case* Chief Justice Hall 
wrote in Foote, "the mandate of the due process clause of article 
I, section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Const, 
is comprehensive in its application to all activities of state 
government. It is the province of the judiciary to assure that a 
claim of the denial of due process by an arm of government be heard 
and, if justified, that it be vindicated." . . . "assuredly, 
the parole board is not outside the constitutional mandate that 
the actions of government must afford due process." Foote v. 
Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734. Judge Hall also stated, 
3-
"there is no question that due process protection apply at the 
time of sentencing by a trial judge . . . H, and "the Utah Const, 
certainly requires that equivalent due process protection be 
afforded when the Board of Pardons determines the actual number 
of years a defendant is to serve.11 Id. at 734-35. 
The petition articulated sufficient facts which required at 
least a cursory look by the court. Judge Young further compounded 
the petitioners right violations by refusing to look into his 
complaint by way of an evidentiary hearing. 
The United States District Court for Utah has also ruled on 
the issue of what rights an inmate is entitled to during a board 
hearing. Judge Thomas Greene set out an even more extensive list 
of rights that an inmate is entitled too, during a board Rearing. 
See attached copy of Judge Greene's order in Hewitt v. Haun, 
92-C-264G. 
The petitioner was denied basic due process rights by the 
Utah Board of Pardons. He articulated sufficient facts to warrant 
habeas corpus review. Judge Young failed to give the petitioner 
access to review, by dismissing the petition on its face. The 
petitioner is entitled to review by the District Court. There 
are sufficient facts alleged in the petition to satisfy the mandate 
set by Chief Justice Hall in Foote. Judge Young abused his discre-
tion and authority by dismissing the petition without a hearing 
on the merits. 
4. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the decision of the lower Court 
and order the matter remanded for hearing* The petition filed by 
the petitioner/appellant articulated sufficient facts to warrant 
a review by the Court, and if proven, to warrant habeas corpus 
relief* The Utah Board of Pardons denied the petitioner all of 
his basic fundamental rightLs under the Utah Constitution and the 
Constitution of the United States* 
DATED this \X* day of August, 1993. 
Ronald J# Curtis 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to Jan Graham, Utah Atty General 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114* postage prepaid and mailed at Draper, 
Utah on the \JU_ day of August, 1993. 
Ronald J. Curtia 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CURTIS, RONALD 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 930901978 HC 
DATE 05/04/93 
HONORABLE DAVID S 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK NP 
YOUNG 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. CURTIS, RONALD, PRO SE 
D. ATTY. 
THE PETITIONER HAS FILED A PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
RELIEF CLAIMING THAT HIS RIGHTS HAVE BEFN VIOLATED BY THE BOARD 
OF PARDONS WHEN THEY STATE.D AT HIS INITIAL HEARING THAT HE WOULD 
BE REQUIRED TO SERVE HIS ENTIRE! TERM WITHOUT PAROLE. THE BASIS 
OF THAT DECISION IS A MATTER WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND MAY NOT BE CHALLENGED WITHOUT AN ALLEGATION 
AS TO WHY THAT DECISIONS MAY BE "ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS" OR 
"CRUEL AND UNUSUAL" IN SOME LEGAL "WAT: =^HE=DEC1SI0N' TO"T*EQUIRE 
THE PETITIONER TO SERVE ANY LAWFUL TIME WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT IS AN APPROPRIATE OPTION OF THE BOARD 
AND IS FURTHER A MATTER FOR THEIR DISCRETION. THE PETITIONER 
ALLEGES NO FACTUAL BASIS WHICH WOULD GIVE RISE TO THE COURT'S 
CONSIDERATION OF THE PETITION ON IT'S MERITS. 
THE PETITION IS THUS DENIED AND DISMISSED. THIS MINUTE 
ENTRY SIGNED BY THE COURT SHALL CONSTITUTE THE FINAL ORDER OF 
THE COURT. 
C.C. TO MR. CURTIS, PRO SE 
R671-303-1 Pardons (Board of) 120 
ing, or are causing a disturbance or interfering with the 
holding of a fair and impartial hearing, restrictions 
may be imposed to eliminate those problems. 
PRIOR APPROVAL. News media representatives 
wishing to use photographic, recording or transmitting 
equipment or to be considered for one of the five 
reserved media seats shall submit a request in writing 
to the Board Administrator. Such requests must be sub-
mitted at least AS hours in advance of a regularly 
scheduled Board of Pardons hearing and at least one 
week in advance of a Commutation Hearing. If request-
ing the use of equipment, the request must specify by 
type, brand and model all the pieces of equipment to be 
used. 
APPROVING EQUIPMENT. If the request is to use 
photographic, recording or transmitting equipment, at 
least 24 hours prior to a regularly scheduled hearing 
and 96 hours prior to a Commutation Hearing, it shall 
be the responsibility of a representative of the news 
agency making the request to confer with the Board 
Administrator to work out the details. If the Board 
Administrator is unfamiliar with the equipment pro-
posed to be used, he may require that a demonstration 
be performed to determine if it is likely to be intrusive, 
cause a disturbance or will inhibit the holding of a fair 
and YmpartisA nearing in any way. M in* Board Admin-
istrator or the Board determines that such may occur, 
it may be required that the equipment be modified or 
substituted for equipment that will not cause a problem 
or the equipment may be banned. 
'Video tape or "on air" type cameras mounted on a tri-
pod and still cameras encased in a soundproof box and 
mounted on a tripod shall be deemed to be approved 
equipment 
If the equipment is approved for use at a hearing, its 
location and mode of operation shall be approved in 
advance by the Board Administrator and it shall 
remain in a stationary position during the entire hear-
ing and shall be operated as unobtrusively as possible. 
There shall be no artificial light used. 
If there is more than one request for the same type of 
equipment, the news agencies shall be required to 
make pool arrangements, as no more than one piece of 
the same type of equipment shall be allowed. If no 
agreement can be reached on who the pool representa-
tive will be, the Board Administrator shall draw a name 
at random. All those wishing to be a pool representative 
must agree in advance to fully cooperate v». v all pool 
arrangements. 
BESEHVED MEDIA SEATING. U tnere are ieweT 
than four other requests received prior to the deadline, 
the request shall be approved. If more than five 
requests are made, the Board Administrator shall allo-
cate the seating based on a pool arrangement. Each cat-
egory shall select its own representatives). If no 
agreement can be reached on who the representative(s) 
will be, the Board Administrator shall draw names at 
random. All those wishing to be a pool representative 
must agree in advance to fully cooperate with all pool 
arrangements. 
One seat shall be allocated to each of the following 
categories: 
1. Local daily newspapers with statewide circulation 
2. Major wire services with local bureaus 
3. Local television stations with regularly scheduled 
daily newscasts 
4. Local radio stations with regularly scheduled daily 
newscasts 
5. Daily, weekly or monthly publications (in that 
order) located in the area where the criminal activity 
took place. 
6. If the requests submitted do not fill all of the above 
categories, a seat shall be allocated to a representative 
of a major wire service with no local bureau or a 
national publication (in that order). 
If seats remain unfilled, one additional seat shall be 
allocated to the categories in the above order until all 
seats are filled. No news agency shall have more than 
one individual assigned to reserved media seating 
unless all other requests have been satisfied. 
VIOLATIONS. Any news agency found to be in viola-
tion of this policy may have its representatives 
restricted in or banned from covering future Board 
hearings. 
1SS7 77-27.5 
R671-303. Offender Access to 
Information. 
R671-303-1. Policy. 
R671-303-2. Procedure. 
R071-3O3-1. Policy. 
An offender shall have access to all information relat-
ing to his case on which parole decisions are made 
except that which is classified confidential. 
R671-303-2. Procedure. 
All material submitted to the Board, except that 
which is specifically classified as confidential, shall be 
available to be reviewed with the offender. 
The Board may review the offender's record and cover 
areas of concern during the hearing. The offender may 
comment, clarify issues and ask questions at the hear-
ing. 
Upon written request from the offender, copies of 
requested information not classified as confidential 
shall be provided at the offender's expense. 
KEY: Inmat—' right* 
1SS7 63-2 MS 
63.2.86.4 
11611-304. Board Bearing Record. 
R671-304-1. Policy. 
R671-304-2. Procedure. 
R671-304-1. Policy. 
The Board shall cause a record to be made of all pro-
ceedings. 
R671-304-2. Procedure. 
A record (verbatim transcript, tape recording or writ-
ten summary) shall be made of all hearings. The record 
shall be retained by the Board for future reference or 
transcription upon request at cost. However, copies 
may be provided at no cost to the petitioner in accor-
dance with UCA 77-27-8 (3). The record shall be 
119 Adminis trat ion R671-302-2 
minimal. Under these circumstances, the offender shall 
be reinstated on parole with appropriate conditions. 
For time spent in mental health facilities, the 
offender shall receive credit toward expiration of sen-
tence and the total period of incarceration. 
KEY: criminal eoaptuncy* 
IMS 77.27-2 
77-27-7 
77-27-12 
R671-301. Personal Appearance. 
R671-30M. Policy. 
R671-301-2. Procedure. 
R671-30M. Policy. 
It is the policy of the Board of Pardons that all offend-
ers shall have a personal appearance before the Board, 
unless waived prior to a final decision to release. 
R671-301-2. Procedure. 
By statute, the Board or its designee is required to see 
each and every offender in at least one hearing. This 
usually occurs at the offender's initial hearing. How-
ever, by policy, the Board requires personal appear-
ances for rehearings in cases when a date was not 
established, for rescission hearings, and for parole revo-
cation hearings. In rehearings, the offender is afforded 
all the rights and considerations afforded in the initial 
hearing except as provided by other Board policies 
because the setting of a parole date is still at issue. In 
rescission hearings and parole revocation hearings, a 
personal appearance is mandatory unless waived. The 
offender is also given adequate notice of such hearings 
so that he may prepare. The hearing is conducted in 
such a manner to minimize distractions and facilitate 
offender input. 
An offender has the right to be present at a parole 
grant, rehearing, rescission, or parole violation hearing 
if he is within the state (UCA 77-27-7). The offender has 
the right to be present at hearings conducted by a 
Board hearing officer. He may speak on his own behalf, 
present documents, ask, and answer questions. An 
offender who waives his right, or refuses to personally 
attend the hearing shall be advised that a decision may 
be made in his absence. 
If an offender is being housed out of state he may 
waive the right to a personal appearance. The waiver 
shall be in writing and witnessed by a staff member at 
the institution where the offender is housed. A written 
waiver shall be voluntary. The original copy of the 
waiver is to be forwarded to the Board and retained in 
the offender's file. 
If the offender refuses to waive the appearance, any of 
the following four alternatives shall be utilized at the 
discretion of the Board in conducting the hearing: 
1. Request the Warden to return the offender to the 
state for the hearing. 
2. A courtesy hearing may be conducted with the con-
sent of the offender by the paroling authority or juris-
diction where he is housed. A request along with a 
complete copy of Utah's record shall be forwarded for 
the hearing. All reports, a summary of the hearing, and 
a recommendation shall be returned to the Utah Board 
for final action. 
3. An individual Board member may travel to the 
jurisdiction and conduct the hearing, record the pro-
ceeding, and make a written record and recommenda-
tion for the Board's final decision. 
4. Send a Board hearing officer to conduct the hear-
ing, record the proceeding and make a written record 
and recommendation for the Board's final decision. 
5. A hearing may be conducted by way of conference 
telephone call with the consent of the offender. 
I0EY: govtnuMnt hMrings 
1*87 77-27-2 
77-27-7 
77-27-t 
77-27-11 
77-27-21 
R671-302. N e w s M e d i a and P u b l i c 
Access to Hearings. 
R671-302-1. Policy. 
R671-302-2. Procedure. 
B671-302-1. Policy. 
According to state law and subject to fairness and 
security requirements, Board of Pardons hearings shall 
be open to the public, including representatives of the 
news media. 
B671-302-2. Procedure. 
LIMITED SEATING. When the number of people 
wishing to attend a hearing exceeds the seating capac-
ity of the room where the hearing will be conducted, pri-
ority shall be given to: 
1. Individuals involved in the hearing 
2. Up to five people selected by the offender 
3. Up to five members of the news media as allocated 
by the Board Administrator (see RESERVED MEDIA 
SEATING) 
4. Members of the public and media4 on a first-come, 
first served basis. 
SECURITY AND CONDUCT. All attendees are sub-
ject to Prison security requirements and must conduct 
themselves in a manner which does not interfere with 
the orderly conduct of the hearing. Any individual caus-
ing a disturbance or engaging in behavior deemed by 
the Board to be disruptive of the proceeding may be 
ordered to leave and security personnel of the prison 
may he requested to escort the individual from the pre-
mises. 
EXECUTIVE SESSION. No filming, recording or 
transmitting of executive session portions of any hear-
ing shall be allowed. 
NEWS MEDIA EQUIPMENT. Subject to prior 
approval by the Board Administrator or the Board (see 
APPROVING EQUIPMENT), the news agency repre-
sentatives shall be permitted to operate photographic, 
recording or transmitting equipment during the public 
portions of any hearing. When more than one news 
agency requests permission to use photographic, 
recording or transmitting equipment, a pooling 
arrangement may be required. 
When it is determined by the Board Administrator or 
the Board that any such equipment or operators of that 
equipment have the potential to cause a disturbance or 
interfere with the holding of a fair and impartial hear-
RONALD CURTIS 
Attorney Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD CURTIS, * 
Petitioner, * PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
* RELIEF 
vs. * 
* 
Utah State Board of Pardons, * Case No. 
SCOTT CARVER, Warden, * 
Respondent. * Judge 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Ronald Curtis, pursuant to the 
following Rule of Civil Procedure: 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on original commitment, or 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on parole violation, or 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on probation violation, or X Rule 65B(c) since claim is based on parole grant hearing, 
and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following 
location: Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
2. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following 
Court: Petitioner is challenging a Board of Pardons hearing. 
The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction (or Board of 
Pardons decision) was entered are as follows: ^ Petitioner's parole 
grant hearing was on March 3, 1989. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
The case number for these proceedings is: not known; known 
and is case number N/A . 
3. In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis 
of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as 
the result of the commitment (or terms of parole) are as follows: 
a. Petitioner attended an original parole grant hearing 
on March 3, 1989. Wherein, petitioner's constitutional due process 
rights were violated. 
b. Petitioner alleges that the respondents set a 
rehearing date for the petitioner above the sentencing guidelines 
without justification or reason. 
c. Petitioner did not receive a rehearing date and was 
sentenced to serve the entire 15 years without a parole date. 
d. Respondents refused and denied the petitioner the 
opportunity to present mitigating facts regarding his case during 
his appearance before the board of pardons and refused to allow the 
petitioner to present witnesses, documents psychiatric reports, 
etc. 
e. Respondents refused and denied the petitioner the 
right to speak during his" appearance before them on March 3, 1989. 
f. Respondents refused and denied the petitioner the 
right to review documents upon which the respondents based their 
2 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
decision. 
g. Respondents also refused and denied the petitioner 
the right to present evidence or testimony on his own behalf. In 
fact, they refused to allow petitioner to speak at all. 
4. The judgment of conviction or the commitment for 
violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal. 
Yes The number and caption or title of the appellate 
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows: 
O^No It was not appealed because ?^6-A</0>P (^IUILTI/ 
_X_Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant 
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remddy. 
5. The legality of the commitment for violation of probation 
or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been 
reviewed on appeal. Yes X No If so, the reasons for the 
denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows: 
N/A 
6. Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel 
based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity. 
7. The following documents are attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply): 
3 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
_X Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations 
Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations, 
Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations 
X Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court in 
any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment 
8, Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following 
documents because (list the efforts you made to obtain the 
documents and the results of your efforts): 
9. That pursuant to URCP Rules 65B(b)(12) and 54(d), 
Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain 
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevant 
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he 
was originally charged be directed to pay the costs of the 
proceeding. (See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity). 
10. The statute of limitations does not apply in this matter 
because the petitioner was convicted prior to the enactment of the 
law, and due to the continuing nature of the petitioner's 
incarceration UCA §78-12-31.5 does not bar this action. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner 
may be present and represented by counsel. 
2. Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed 
4 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
without prepayment of costs< fees or other assessments. 
3. Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in 
Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in 
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above. 
4. Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the 
Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged 
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint. 
Dated this ^ day of 1 Aftfl\J> , 199 2 . 
RONALD CURTIS 
Attorney Pro Se 
5 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTL^ • , "V 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION ^ / 
DAVID LEE HEWITT, 
Plaintiff, ORDER 
vs. 
PETE HAUN, et al.f Civil No. 92-C-264G 
Respondent. 
Plaintiff, David Lee Hewitt ("Hewitt"), an inmate 
confined at the Utah State Prison (USP), filed suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. He is suing members of the Board of Pardon in 
their official and individual capacities. Hewitt claims that the 
Board members violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to due process, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and his 
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment« 
The case was referred to the Magistrate Judge under 28 
U.S.C- § 636(b)(1)(B), who concluded that Hewitts claims were 
without merit and recommended that his complaint be dismissed 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Hewitt timely filed Objections to the 
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. 
The Court finds that oral argument would not be of 
material assistance in determining the issues in this case. 
Accordingly, Hewitt's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report 
and Recommendation will be reviewed de novo and decided on the 
existing record. 
FACTS 
On or about November 1, 1991, after having been 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term by a 
Utah state court judge, Hewitt appeared before the Utah Board of 
Pardons for his initial parole release hearing. According to 
Hewitt's complaint, he was not allowed to present witnesses, 
cross-examine witnesses or view any of the reports used by the 
Board in making its sentencing determination. Further, Hewitt 
claims that he was not allowed to have an attorney present. 
Finally, he contends his sentence was based on several unrelated 
arrests and exceeded Utah Sentencing Guidelines. 
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 
Since this matter is before the Court on a 
recommendation of dismissal, we assume without deciding that 
Hewitt's factual allegations are correct. Dock v. Latimer* 729 
F.2d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 1984). The issues involved in this 
motion are (1) whether the alleged actions of the members of the 
Board of Pardon could potentially constitute violations of 
Hewitt's rights under the United States Constitution1 and (2) 
"The first inquiry in any S 1983 suit is whether the plaintiff has been 
deprived of a right *secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." 
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). 
2 
whether the members of the Board could potentially be held liable 
for such violations.2 
ANALYSIS 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Hewitt alleges that three constitutional rights 
violations occurred at his initial parole release hearing before 
the Utah Board of Pardons. First, that his rights to due process 
of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated 
when he was not allowed to present witnesses, cross-examine 
witnesses, or view reports. Second, that his Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel were violated when the 
Board did not allow him to have an attorney present at his parole 
hearing. Third, that he was subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment contrary to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
because the Board used improper factors to exceed its own 
sentencing guidelines. The Magistrate Judge found that Hewitt's 
complaint was without merit and that the parole officers are 
entitled to absolute immunity. The issues will be discussed 
seriatim. 
A. Due Process Rights Under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments 
If a plaintiff has been deprived of a constitutional right, it must then 
be determined whether the state parole officials have immunity as a matter of 
federal law. See Dock, 729 F.2d at 1291. 
3 
Hewitts first claim is that his Fifth and Fourteenth 
due process rights were violated by the manner in which his 
initial parole release hearing was conducted. The court finds 
that Hewitt's allegations could potentially form a cause of 
action* 
1. Due Process Rights at a Parole Release Hearing 
The Federal Constitution itself does not grant a 
prisoner due process rights at a parole release hearing. 
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). 
However, state laws can create liberty interests which are then 
protected by the United States Constitution. A state cannot 
deprive a person of those interests without due process of law.3 
No protectible liberty interest is created by the Utah1 
Parole Statutes as such.4 However a liberty interest at the 
initial parole release hearing does exist under Utah/s 
indeterminate sentencing scheme. Under that law, the Board of 
Pardons determines a defendants sentence at the initial parole 
release hearing. The Supreme Court of Utah has held that due 
* See Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1255 (6th Cir. 1977); Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); and Pope v. United States Parole Commission, 
647 F.2d 125, 126 (10th Cir. 1981). 
A liberty interest in parole is recognized when a state's statutes 
create an expectation of parole. The mere existence of a parole system does not 
create such an interest. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates. 442 U.S. 1, 12 
(1979). Utah Parole Statutes do not create an expectation of parole, thus there 
is no liberty interest under those statutes. Houtz v. DeLand, 718 F.Supp. 1497, 
1502 (D. Utah, 1989). 
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process p ro t ec t i ons must be provided a t t h a t hear ing . 5 In Foote 
v. Utah Board of Pardons, t he cour t s t a t e d : 
[ t ] h e r e i s no ques t ion t h a t due process 
p ro t ec t ions apply a t the time of sentencing 
by the t r i a l judge, whether the judge 
determines the a c t u a l number of years t o be 
served, as in the f ede ra l cour t s and some 
s t a t e c o u r t s , or only whether t o send the 
defendant t o p r i son , as i s the case in Utah. 
The Utah Cons t i tu t ion c e r t a i n l y r equ i r e s t h a t 
equiva lent due process p ro t ec t i on be afforded 
when the board of pardons determines the 
ac tua l number of years a defendant i s t o 
se rve . 
Foote, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 
The reasoning in Foote i s compelling. As t he Supreme 
Court has s t a t e d , " the sentencing process , as well as t he t r i a l 
i t s e l f , must s a t i s f y the requirements of the Due Process Clause . " 
United S t a t e s v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir 1987).6 
This Court holds t h a t due process p ro t ec t i ons a r e requ i red a t t h e 
i n i t i a l pa ro le r e l e a s e hea r ing . 
2. P l a i n t i f f ' s Asserted Due Process Violat ions 
"[D]ue process i s f l e x i b l e and c a l l s for such 
procedural p ro t ec t ions as t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n demands. 
Sta te court i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t s laws are not binding upon a f edera l 
court in determining federal c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s . Sh ir l ey v . Chestnut, 603 
F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1979); Martin v . Duf f ie , 463 F.2d 464, 468 (10th Cir . 
1972) . Nonetheless , a federal court may cons ider s t a t e court d e c i s i o n s t o a s s i s t 
i t in determining what r i g h t s s t a t e laws c r e a t e . Jd. at 468. 
6
 See a l s o Mempa v. Rhav, 389 .U .S . 128, 134-137 (1967) (non-cap i ta l 
punishment c a s e ) ; Accord Gardner v . F lor ida , 430 U.S. 349, 1204 (1977) ( c a p i t a l 
punishment c a s e ) ; Burlington v . Missouri , 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) ( c a p i t a l 
punishment c a s e ) . 
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. . ." Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Merely 
because due process applies does not automatically mean a 
defendant is entitled to the full spectrum of rights which are 
recognized in the process of conviction- Greenholtz v. Nebraska 
Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). 
Defendant Hewitt alleges that his rights to due process 
of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments were violated at 
his initial parole release hearing when: (1) he was not allowed 
to call witnesses at the hearing to testify in his behalf; (2) he 
was not allowed to cross examine witnesses who testified against 
him; and (3) he was not allowed to view reports submitted to the 
Board, including a presentence report. 
Regarding the first alleged violation, a limited due 
process right to present witnesses exists. Such a right has been 
recognized in other cases where the situations involved seemed 
less crucial to a defendants rights than the present case. 
Regarding the second alleged violation, the Magistrate 
Judge ruled that a defendant does not have an absolute right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses at a sentencing hearing.8 
We agree. 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (an inmate has the right to 
call witnesses in his behalf at a disciplinary prison proceeding, so long as it 
will not jeopardize institutional safety). 
8
 United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1543 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(referring to Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) and Williams v. Oklahoma, 
358 U.S. 576 (1959)); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 
1990) (citing Sunrhodes). 
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Regarding the third al leged v io la t ion , a due process 
right of reasonable access to documents used in making a 
sentencing determination e x i s t s , "Due process requires that a 
defendant not be sentenced on the basis of *misinformation of a 
const i tut ional magnitude,'•• United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 
1177, 1181 (10th. Cir. 1990), c i t ing United States v. Tucker. 404 
U.S. 443, 447 (1972) .9 I t appears to the Court that the 
opportunity to review and correct erroneous information i s 
e s sent ia l to the protection of t h i s right.1 0 
B. Right to Legal Counsel Under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments 
Regarding Hewitt's second claim, that h i s Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment r ights to counsel were v io lated when the 
Board did not allow him to have an attorney present at h i s parole 
hearing, a prisoner does have the r ight to legal counsel at an 
i n i t i a l hearing. The Supreme Court has stated that "appointment 
of counsel . . . i s required at every stage of a criminal 
proceeding where substantial r ights of a criminal accused may be 
I n
 Beaul ieu . the Court held that t h i s r ight was protected by the Federal 
Sentencing Guide l ine ' s requirement that a federal prisoner "be g iven adequate 
no t i ce of and an opportunity t o rebut or expla in information that i s used aga ins t 
him." 893 F.2d at 1181. 
10
 See a l s o Lynch v. United S ta te s Parole Commission 768 F.2d 491 , 498 
(2d. Cir. 1985) . A parolee has a due process r ight t o view a presentence report 
pr ior t o a parole revocat ion hearing. Howeverf t h i s r igh t i s l i m i t e d and i f 
d i s c l o s u r e would " s e r i o u s l y d i srupt the p r i s o n e r ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l program; r e v e a l 
conf ident ia l sources of information; or r e s u l t in harm t o any person . . . " then 
reasonable access means a summary of the unprotected mater ia l ." 
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affected." Mempa v. Walklina, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1969).u In 
another case, Gardner v. Florida, the Supreme Court stated: 
[I]t is now clear that the sentencing 
process, as well as the trial itself, must 
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause. . . . [T]he sentencing is a critical 
stage of the criminal proceeding at which 
[the prisoner] is entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Gardner, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977), citing Mempa, 389 U.S. at 
134. n 
Manifestly, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists 
during the sentencing stage of criminal proceedings, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees this right to defendants in state 
trials. Gideon v. Wainwriaht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
C, Rights to be Free of Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under 
the Eighth Amendment 
Defendant Hewitt claims that his hearing did not comply 
with state guidelines and thus violated his due process rights 
and submitted him to cruel and unusual punishment. These claims 
will be addressed as two issues. First, that the Board of 
Pardons considered factors in making it's determination which 
were improper under Utah's Sentencing Guidelines, and second, 
that the guideline recommendations were exceeded. 
See also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-35 (1986) and Moran 
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-32 (1986). 
12 
Gardner was a capital punishment case, but the court's statement 
about a prisoner's right to counsel at sentencing does not appear to be 
restricted to capital punishment cases. 
8 
1. Consideration of Improper Factors 
The Court assumes without deciding that Hewitt's 
allegations are true and that the Board of Pardons considered 
factors not specifically set out in Utah's Sentencing Guidelines• 
The Court finds that there is no federally protected 
constitutional right to limit the Board of Pardon's 
considerations. 
In the federal system, federal statutes allow a 
sentencing judge to consider any reliable information13 in making 
a determination of a federal prisoner's sentence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 
3661. These statutes do not violate an individual's 
constitutional rights. Similarly, this Court holds that the Utah 
Board of Pardon's consideration of reliable information is 
allowable under the federal constitution. 
This Court agrees with the Magistrate's conclusion that 
Utah's Sentence and Release Guidelines do not bind the Board or 
create a liberty interest. This court adopts the Magistrate 
Judge's ruling in this regard: "The guidelines of the Utah Board 
of Pardons are permissive and non-binding. . . * The Board of 
Pardons may exceed their guidelines as they determine proper and 
no violation of federal law results." Magistrate's Report and 
Recommendation p. 4. Further, the applicable Utah Statutes do 
13
 United States v. Bavlin, 535 F.Supp. 1145, remanded on other grounds 
696 F.2d 1030 (information a court considers must be reliable under $ 3661). 
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not create a federally protected liberty interest in restricting 
the information which the Board of Pardons considers. See U.C.A. 
1953 § 77-18-1 (5)(b); U.C.A. 1953 § 77-18-5; U.C.A. 1953 § 77-
27-13 (2) and (5); Utah Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a). 
2* Exceeding Sentencing Guidelines 
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that there 
is no federal constitutional right to object to a sentence above 
the state guidelines so long as the statutory maximum is not 
exceeded.14 
II • IMMUNITY OF PAROLE OFFICERS 
The Court next looks at whether members of the Utah 
Board of Pardon have immunity as a matter of federal law. 
The Magistrate Judge properly determined that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars Hewitts suit against the parole officers 
in their official capacity. 
Relying upon Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58 (1989), the Magistrate Judge determined that state 
officials also have absolute immunity as individuals. However, 
in Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358 (1991) the Supreme Court held 
that "state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are 
persons within the meaning of § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune 
14
 United States v. Jimenez. 928 F.2d 356, 364 (10th Cir. 1991) ("A 
sentence imposed within the prescribed statutory limits generally will not be 
found to be cruel and unusual.") 
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from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the 
official nature of their acts." Id,, at 365. Under this ruling, 
the individual Board of Pardon members are not protected by 
absolute sovereign immunity. However, they may be qualifiedly 
immune from Plaintiff's claims.15 
Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate's Report and 
Recommendation is approved in part, and remanded in part. 
Consequently, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that this case is referred back to the 
Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for entry 
of an order of service of process of plaintiff's complaint and 
this order, instructing Defendants to respond to Plaintiff's 
allegations pertaining to the following claimed violations of his 
rights in connection with the initial parole release hearing, 
(1) the limited right to present witnesses; 
(2) the limited right of reasonable access to 
documents; 
(3) the right to counsel. 
In addition, defendants may submit to the court 
documentation and information as to whether qualif ied immunity 
bars l i a b i l i t y of defendants in the i r individual capac i t i e s . 
Qual i f i ed immunity p r o t e c t s government o f f i c i a l s from l i a b i l i t y for 
damages - i n s o f a r as t h e i r conduct does not v i o l a t e c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d s ta tu tory 
or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s of which a reasonable person would have known.** Harlow 
v , F i t zgera ld , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Griess v . S ta te of Colorado, 841 F.2d 
1042, 1047 (10th Cir . 1988) . 
1 1 
DATED: September _^_T_, 1992. 
J./THOMAS GREENE 
IITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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